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I. JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by Judge 
David S. Young granting specific performance of an Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement (the "Contract") between defendant/appellant 
Thomas H. Schwartz ("Schwartz"), as seller, and 
plaintiff/appellee C. Steven Fehlauer ("Fehlauer"), as buyer. 
Trial Exhibit 12. Appendix Tab 1. After denying Schwartz's 
motion to continue the trial to a day that Schwartz was not a 
candidate in a special primary election for the Massachusetts 
Legislature, the trial court conducted a bench trial without the 
attendance of Schwartz. The trial court rejected Schwartz's 
defense that an express condition precedent to performance of the 
Contract had not been satisfied, and entered judgment on June 16, 
1994. 
The trial court announced its decision in favor of Fehlauer 
on May 10, 1994, and Schwartz filed his Notice of Appeal on May 
26, 1994. Record at 117. Neither party filed post trial 
motions. This Notice of Appeal was treated as filed after entry 
of the Judgment on June 16, 1994 pursuant to Rule 4(c) Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. Schwartz also filed a Restated Notice of 
Appeal on July 6, 1994. Record at 196. 
The Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1994) and assigned 
the appeal to the Court of Appeals on August 16, 1994, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1994). 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION IN TRIAL COURT 
1. Issue for Review. Did the trial court abuse its 
discretion by conducting the trial on the same day that Schwartz 
was a candidate in a primary election for the Massachusetts 
Legislature? 
Standard of Review. The Court should review this issue 
using an abuse of discretion standard. Bairas v. Johnson, 
13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375, 377-78 (1962); Radcliffe v. 
Akhavan. 875 P.2d 608, 610-11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); 
Preservation in Trial Court. Schwartz filed an Objection to 
Scheduling Order and Trial Setting and Motion to Continue 
Trial with a supporting memorandum. Record at 51-62. 
Schwartz renewed the Objection and Motion on the day of 
trial. Record at 222-236. 
2. Issue for Review. May an express condition precedent, 
providing that the contractual obligation to sell property is 
subject to the sale of another property on or before a specified 
date, be satisfied by substantial performance? 
Standard of Review. The Court should review this issue for 
correctness. The trial court's conclusion of law is given 
no particular deference. United Park City Mines Co. v. 
Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). 
Preservation in Trial Court. Fehlauer had alleged 
compliance with all conditions in his Complaint and Schwartz 
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had denied the allegations in the Answer. Record at 3 and 
20. Schwartz filed a Trial Brief addressing this issue. 
Record at 72-81. The trial court acknowledged reviewing 
Schwartz's Trial Brief before trial. Record at 221. The 
trial court addressed the issue in Conclusion of Law Nos. l-
5. Record at 169-170. 
3. Issue for Review. May a trial court reform an express 
condition where the trial court did not find a mutual mistake of 
fact? 
Standard of Review. The Court should review this issue 
using a correction of error standard. Woodward v. Fazzio, 
823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Preservation in Trial Court. In equity proceedings, 
including claims for reformation, the Court is free to 
review both the facts and the law as found and applied by 
the trial court. Dugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955 (Utah 1986). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of The Case. 
This is an equity action for specific performance of a real 
estate purchase contract. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Fehlauer filed his Complaint on September 7, 1993. Schwartz 
answered on December 7, 1993 denying that he was obligated to 
convey the property because the following express condition 
precedent had not been satisfied: 
3 
Subject to Sale of House & Property located 
at 841 S. W. Hoytsville Rd., Coalville on or 
before July 6, 1993. 
Exhibit 12. 
The condition provided that Schwartz was not required to sell the 
property if the sale of adjacent property did not occur on or 
before a specified date. 
After limited discovery, counsel for Fehlauer filed a 
Request for Trial Setting on February 4, 1994. On March 28, 
1994, counsel for the parties and Judge Young participated in a 
telephone scheduling conference. During the conference, counsel 
for Schwartz argued that her client could not attend a trial of 
the case before July 1994 because he was a candidate for the 
Massachusetts State Legislature and that he could not leave 
Massachusetts until after the election. Nevertheless Judge Young 
scheduled trial for May 10, 1994. Record at 210-212. 
Shortly after the scheduling conference, it became known 
that Schwartz could not attend the scheduled trial on May 10, 
1994 because it was the same date as the primary election for the 
Massachusetts Legislature. Therefore, on April 5, 1994, Schwartz 
made a written Objection to the Scheduling Order and Trial 
Setting, and Motion to Continue Trial. Record at 51-52. 
Appendix Tab 2. The trial court had granted no previous 
continuances and less than six months had passed since Fehlauer 
filed the Complaint 
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Counsel for Fehlauer agreed that "the present trial setting 
of May 10-11 is inappropriate in view of the May 10 Massachusetts 
primary election," and that "exigencies of a campaign preclude an 
earlier setting." Fehlauer further conceded that a victory in 
the primary election may require a trial setting after June 7, 
the date of the Massachusetts general election. Record at 64. 
On April 26, 1994, Judge Young conducted a Pretrial and 
Settlement Conference. When Judge Young suggested several 
possible trial settings through the end of June 1994, Schwartz 
stated that he could not commit to a trial setting without 
knowing the result of his bid for the Massachusetts Legislature. 
Over Schwartz's objections, Judge Young ruled that the trial 
would go forward on May 10, 1994, the day of the Massachusetts 
primary election. Record at 212-213. 
C. Disposition in the Court Below. 
The trial court conducted a non-jury trial on May 10, 1994. 
Schwartz was not present because of his required participation in 
and attendance at the Massachusetts primary election. Trial 
counsel for Schwartz renewed her objection to the trial setting 
and again sought a continuance. Record at 222-236. Judge Young 
denied both motions. Trial counsel for Schwartz did not 
otherwise participate except to respond to questions from the 
trial court at the end of the trial. Record at 323-326. 
Fehlauer presented his case and the court ruled in his 
favor. The trial court entered the following Conclusions of Law 
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on June 16, 1994 which excused the express condition precedent to 
the Contract. 
4. Under the facts and circumstances of this 
transaction, the closing of the Madsen contracts by 
July 6 was not a material term of the 
[Schwartz/Fehlauer] contract so long as those contracts 
were actually closed within a reasonable time after 
July 6, which they were. 
5. Alternatively, and as an independent ground for 
relief, the extension of the Madsen closing date for 15 
days, from July 1 to July 16 extended the July 6 
provision of the addendum/counterclaim of the 
[Schwartz/Fehlauer] contract for the same number of 
days, to July 21, 1993. Ms. Madsen had closed before 
that date so the [Schwartz/Fehlauer] contract remained 
viable. 
6. Alternatively, and as another independent ground 
for relief, by its equity jurisdiction the Court can 
reform paragraph 6 of the counteroffer/addendum to read 
as was understood and intended: "Subject to sale of 
house & property located at 841 S. W. Hoytsville Rd, 
Coalville to Nancy Madsen pursuant to agreements 
already in place." 
Record at 169-170. Appendix Tab 3 (emphasis in original). The 
trial court entered Final Judgment on June 16, 1994. Record at 
173-177. Appendix Tab 4. 
IV. FACTS 
In 1992, Schwartz acquired approximately 23 acres of land 
near Hoytsville, Utah from Robert H. and Joan Williams (the 
"older Williams") with financing provided by the older Williams. 
After living in a house on the property for sometime, Schwartz 
listed the property for sale with an agent from Coldwell Banker 
who co-listed the property with the older Williams' son, Robert 
Williams (the "younger Williams"). Schwartz originally listed 
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all 23 acres of the property, but when it did not sell, he split 
the property into two parcels. The first parcel consisted of 
approximately 5 acres upon which a house was constructed 
("Parcels A and B") and the remaining parcel consisted of 
approximately 17 acres ("Parcel C"). Finding of Fact No. 2. 
Record at 162-163. 
Nancy C. Madsen ("Madsen") became interested in parcels A 
and B but requested that the property be further divided in order 
to satisfy her financing needs. The negotiations resulted in two 
separate Earnest Money Sales Agreements. The first Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement provided for the sale of the house and 
approximately 3.89 acres ("Parcel A") with financing to be 
provided by a lending institution. (Exhibit 8). The second 
covered approximately 2.84 acres of vacant land ("Parcel B") with 
financing to be provided by Schwartz. (Exhibit 7). Madsen was 
to close both agreements by July 1, 1993. Finding of Fact No. 2. 
Record at 163. 
During this time, Fehlauer searched for a parcel of rural 
property upon which to build a home. He and his wife had been 
raised in a rural setting and desired a location that would give 
them the benefits of a rural life yet be close to Fehlauer's 
employment as a doctor at the University of Utah. Record at 317. 
While conducting a search on their own, they saw a "for sale" 
sign on Parcel C and made further inquiries. These inquiries 
resulted in an offer from Fehlauer and a counter offer by 
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Schwartz, which were exchanged by telephone facsimile. Record at 
278. Findings of Fact No. 2 C , 4, 5. Record at 163-164A. These 
documents constituted the Contract enforced by the trial court.1 
(Exhibit 12). The Contract contained an express condition, 
written personally by Schwartz, making the Contract to sell 
Parcel C subject to the sale of the adjacent Parcels A and B on 
or before July 6, 1993. Exhibit 12. 
Shortly before July 1, 1993, the scheduled closing for the 
sale of Parcels A and B to Madsen, the lending institution stated 
that it could not complete approval of the loan on Parcel A 
because of an issue related to the appraisal. Finding of 
Fact No. 10. Record at 165. Schwartz first stated his intention 
not to complete the transaction because of the failure to close 
both Parcel A and B on July 1, 1993, but eventually closed both 
transactions on Friday, July 16, 1993. Record at 285-286, 288. 
He received the proceeds of the sale on Tuesday, July 20, 1993. 
Findings of Fact No. 16-17. Record at 166-167. 
Prior to closing the sale of Parcels A and B to Madsen, 
Schwartz made a payment of $56,000.00 to the older Williams on 
July 1, 1993, from funds other than those he later received from 
Madsen on July 20, 1993. Finding of Fact No. 7. Record at 164. 
After closing, Schwartz also gave the older Williams a new note 
1
 In his Answer, Schwartz denied the existence of the Contract 
because a signed version was never delivered to him. For purposes 
of this appeal only, however, Schwartz does not contest the 
conclusion of law that a valid contract existed. 
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and trust deed against Parcel C for $80,000.00. Finding of Fact 
No. 15. Record at 166. 
Fehlauer made the payments required under the Contract for 
Parcel C to Old Republic Title Company of Utah, Inc. ("Old 
Republic") before the stated closing date of August 13, 1993. 
Finding of Fact No. 21. Record at 168. Old Republic sent 
documents to Schwartz by Federal Express delivery on August 10, 
1993 which Schwartz did not actually receive until August 17, 
1993. Schwartz did not execute the documents because the 
condition precedent requiring the sale of the adjacent property 
did not occur until July 20, 1993, after the required date of 
July 6, 1993. Old Republic did not complete the closing on 
Parcel C because they did not have conveyancing documents from 
Schwartz. Findings of Fact No. 20 and 22. Record at 167-168. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court abused its discretion in not continuing the 
trial from May 10, 1994 when it learned that the trial date was 
the same day as a special primary election in Massachusetts for 
which Schwartz was a candidate. By conducting the trial on a 
date that Schwartz could not attend, the trial court denied 
Schwartz the right to be in attendance at his own trial, to 
testify on his own behalf and to assist his trial counsel. 
Even if the trial court had not abused its discretion by 
refusing to continue the trial, the trial court erred in excusing 
the condition which unequivocally required the sale of adjacent 
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property before a specific date. Because this term was an 
express condition precedent containing a specific time limit, it 
did not also require a "time is of the essence" clause. The 
express condition precedent could only be satisfied by strict 
compliance. 
Finally, the trial court reformed the express condition 
precedent without finding that Schwartz and Fehlauer had made a 
mutual mistake of fact and without any evidence that the parties 
made a mutual mistake. 
VI. ARGUMENTS 
A. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Conducting the 
Trial on the Same Day Schwartz Was a Candidate for the 
Massachusetts Legislature in a Special Primary Election. 
The Utah Supreme Court has provided guidance for determining 
when a trial court abuses its discretion in not granting a 
continuance. In Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977) 
the Court stated: 
When counsel has made timely objections, 
given necessary notice, and made a reasonable 
effort to have the trial date changed for 
good cause, courts have held it to be an 
abuse of discretion not to grant a 
continuance. 
560 P.2d. at 1376 (emphasis added). 
Although Schwartz complied with these requirements and made every 
effort to inform the trial court of his dilemma, the court 
refused to grant a continuance. The trial court's refusal 
constitutes an abuse of its discretion. 
10 
1. Schwartz Repeatedly Made Known to the Trial 
Court that he was a Candidate for the 
Massachusetts Legislature in a Special 
Primary Election Held on the Same Day Set for 
Trial, 
Schwartz made timely objections and gave necessary notice to 
the court that he was required to participate in and to attend 
the special primary election for the Massachusetts Legislature on 
the day scheduled for trial.2 First, on March 28, 1994, during a 
telephone scheduling conference, Schwartz told the trial court of 
his candidacy for the Massachusetts State Legislature and of the 
fact that this commitment would make it difficult for him to 
attend a trial in Utah until July 1994. The trial court, 
nevertheless set the trial for May 10, 1994. 
Second, on April 5, 1994, upon learning that the 
Massachusetts special primary election in May was scheduled for 
the very day that the trial court had scheduled the trial, 
Schwartz filed an Objection to Scheduling Order and Trial Setting 
and Motion to Continue Trial. Schwartz filed his motion within 
seven days after the telephone scheduling conference and more 
than thirty days before the scheduled trial date. Record at 51. 
Schwartz supported the motion with a certificate from the town 
clerk of Douglas, Massachusetts confirming that Schwartz was a 
2
 Rather than attend the May 10 trial, Schwartz participated 
successfully in the Massachusetts primary. He was subsequently 
defeated in the general election held on June 7, 1993. Thus, as 
events occurred Schwartz would have been available for trial in 
Utah anytime after June 7, 1993. 
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candidate for State Representative in the special state primary 
on May 10, 1994. Record at 62. 
Instead of vigorously opposing the motion, Fehlauer agreed 
with Schwartz and acknowledged that the trial setting of May 10 
was "inopportune." Fehlauer then suggested a procedure whereby 
the trial court would review the trial setting in light of the 
results of Schwartz's candidacy in Massachusetts with a 
possibility that the trial could be held as late as July if 
Schwartz continued to win elections and indeed served as a 
Representative in the Massachusetts Legislature. Record at 64. 
Third, on April 26, 1994, at the Pretrial Scheduling 
Conference, Schwartz reiterated that he could not attend on May 
10, 1994 and could not commit to another date before July because 
he did not know the results of his bid for the Massachusetts 
Legislature. The trial court and counsel for Schwartz and 
Fehlauer reviewed the available dates on the trial court's 
calendar through the end of June 1994 when Judge Young was 
scheduled to be replaced in Summit County. Despite Schwartz's 
arguments, the trial court denied the Motion to Continue and 
ordered that trial be conducted on May 10, 1994. Record at 212-
213. 
Finally, on May 10, 1994, the date of trial, Schwartz 
renewed his objection to the trial setting and motion to 
continue. The trial court again denied the motion. Record at 
222-236. 
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Schwartz repeatedly made known to the trial court that he 
could not attend the scheduled trial date. Nevertheless, the 
trial court refused to continue the trial. 
2. Schwartz Made Reasonable Efforts to Have the Trial 
Date Changed for Good Cause. 
Schwartz also made reasonable efforts to have the trial date 
changed for good cause. Schwartz's participation in a special 
primary election outside of Utah on the same day set for trial 
presented sufficient cause to have the trial date changed. He 
also made reasonable arguments why he could not commit in advance 
to a trial date without knowing the results of the primary 
election on May 10 and the final election on June 7, 1994. If he 
won both elections, he would be committed to attend legislative 
sessions until July 11, 1994. 
The trial court dismissed these arguments apparently 
believing he was compelled to schedule the trial before July 
because his assignment as a judge in Summit County expired June 
30. However, nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure or the 
Rules of Judicial Administration would have prevented the trial 
court from deferring trial until after July 1, 1994 when a new 
judge would be assigned duty in Summit County. The trial court 
had decided no other pretrial motions that would have given him 
any particular familiarity with the case so as to make him more 
efficient than any other judge to conduct the trial. The only 
prior hearings before the trial court had been the scheduling 
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conferences on March 28, 1994 and April 26, 1994. Even if the 
trial court had some familiarity with the case, no prohibition 
would have prevented holding the trial in Salt Lake City during 
July, upon the consent of the parties. 
Fehlauer advanced his desire to take advantage of the 
construction year as the reason for conducting a trial before 
July 1994. Record at 211. However, even a trial in July would 
have provided Fehlauer with construction time during the 
remainder of the summer and fall. A trial on May 10 rather than 
in July gained only approximately eight weeks. This possible 
delay in construction time to Fehlauer must be compared to the 
actual denial to Schwartz of his ability to participate at trial. 
Schwartz's actual loss of the ability to participate and defend 
himself at trial far overshadows Fehlauer's possible loss of 
construction time. 
This case is similar to Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d. 269, 
373 P.2d 375 (1962) in which the Utah Supreme Court found an 
abuse of discretion when a party could not attend his trial. A 
plaintiff had filed a personal injury claim resulting from an 
automobile accident which had left him paralyzed in a hospital in 
California. After two prior postponements, because the 
plaintiff's medical condition did not permit attendance in Utah, 
the trial court set a new trial date. Two days before trial, 
plaintiff's California counsel advised the trial court by 
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telegram that plaintiff's condition did not permit his travel to 
and attendance at a trial in Utah. 
On the day set for trial, with the defendants in court, 
witnesses present and the jury in the box, plaintiff's counsel 
moved for another continuance. The defendant had objected to 
prior continuances upon the ground that the plaintiff's lawsuit 
was the sole barrier to final disposition of the defendant's 
estate and that delay would cause hardship, inconvenience and 
additional penalties and interest to the defendants. The trial 
court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, ruled that 
insufficient grounds for a continuance existed and ruled that 
timely notice had not been given. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial 
court's refusal to grant an additional continuance was an abuse 
of discretion. The Court reasoned in part that: 
[I]t is in accord with the most fundamental 
traditions of our legal system that a party 
should be afforded every reasonable 
opportunity to be in attendance at his trial. 
Id. at 378 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court also recognized "the importance of allowing a 
party to be in attendance at the trial to testify and assist his 
counsel." Id. 
The Court concluded by stating: 
We are, of course, cognizant that the five-
week delay would have resulted in some 
hardship to the defendants and others, and 
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that two witnesses have died since the 
accident. However, the relative significance 
of these facts is overshadowed by the 
potential loss to the plaintiff. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The trial court in the present case did not afford Schwartz 
every reasonable opportunity to be in attendance at his trial. 
Further, the trial court ignored the importance of allowing 
Schwartz to be in attendance to testify and assist his counsel. 
Finally, the potential delay in Fehlauer's construction plans was 
far overshadowed by the actual loss to Schwartz of his right to 
attend and participate in the trial. For the foregoing reasons, 
the trial court abused its discretion by denying Schwartz the 
opportunity to be in attendance at his own trial and to testify 
and assist his counsel. 
B. The Trial Court Should Not Have Excused the Condition 
Precedent in the Contract which Makes Schwartz's 
Obligations Subject to the Sale of an Adjacent Property 
on or Before July 6. 1993. 
Even if the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to continue the trial, it did make fundamental errors of 
law based on the evidence presented solely by Fehlauer. The 
trial court improperly ignored the express condition precedent to 
Schwartz's obligation to convey the property. 
1. The Clause of the Contract Making Schwartz's 
Obligation Subject to the Sale of an Adjacent 
Property on or Before July 6, 1993 is an 
Express Condition Precedent. 
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The Contract which Fehlauer sought to enforce contained the 
following clause: 
Subject to Sale of House & Property at 841 
S.W. Hoytsville Rd., Coalville or before July 
6, 1993. 
Exhibit 12 (emphasis added). 
This clause created an express condition precedent to Schwartz' 
obligation to convey the property to Fehlauer. 
The general rule is that the use of the words "subject to" 
creates a condition precedent. 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 466 
at 487 (1991). For example, in Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 
P.2d 1240, 1242 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court upheld a 
finding that a clause in a real estate purchase contract 
containing the words "subject to" created a condition precedent. 
It further held that if the described event did not occur, the 
performance by the seller would be excused. 
Similarly, numerous other courts have expressly recognized 
that the use of the term "subject to" creates a condition 
precedent. E.g. Riess v. Murchinson, 329 F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir. 
1964), cert, denied 383 U.S. 946 (1966) ("subject to" makes a 
contractual duty dependent upon the occurrence of an uncertain 
event); Ross v. Harding, 391 P.2d 526, 531 (Wash. 1964) ("subject 
to" language leaves no room for interpretation that performance 
of a promise is dependent upon some other event); Boulevard 
Builders, Inc. v. Snyder, 108 N.W.2d 914, 915 (Wis. 1961) 
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("subject to" are "usual words used in creating and stating a 
condition precedent"). 
Fehlauer did not contest the conclusion that this "subject 
to" clause created a condition precedent. Rather, when the 
condition had not been satisfied, Fehlauer argued that strict 
performance of the express condition precedent should be excused. 
2. An Express Condition Precedent Containing a Time 
Limit Does not Also Require an Express Agreement 
that Time is of the Essence. 
Fehlauer argued and the trial court concluded that the time 
limit of July 6, 1993 could be analyzed for materiality because a 
"time is of the essence" provision did not apply to the express 
condition precedent. Conclusion of Law No. 3. Record at 170. 
The trial court therefore concluded that the July 6, 1993 date 
was not a material term and that the express condition precedent 
could be satisfied so long as the adjacent property was sold 
within a reasonable time after July 6, 1993. Conclusion of Law 
No. 4. Record at 170. The trial court erred in holding that the 
express condition precedent also required a "time is of the 
essence" provision in order for the July 6, 1993 deadline to be 
strictly observed. 
The Utah Court of Appeals recognized the principles of when 
"time is of the essence" provisions are required in Barker v. 
Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A seller under 
a land exchange agreement claimed that the contract was void 
because of the buyers failure to perform in a timely manner. 
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The Court of Appeals noted the general law concerning time of the 
essence provisions: 
Time is of the essence in land contracts only 
if it can be shown that the parties so 
intended. This can be demonstrated in two 
ways. First, the contract can explicitly 
state that time is of the essence, or it can 
include language that requires a forfeiture 
of the deposit or an avoidance of the 
contract if the deadline is not met. Second, 
the circumstances surrounding the transaction 
can imply that "the parties intended 
timeliness of performance to be of paramount 
concern." 
Id. at 552 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
If the contractual language specifically allows a party to avoid 
the contract if the terms of a condition are not met by a 
specific deadline, then a "time is of the essence" clause is 
irrelevant. The language used in the Fehlauer/Schwartz Contract 
constitutes an avoidance of the Contract and sets a specific 
deadline. Therefore the presence of a "time is of the essence" 
clause is not required. 
Courts from other jurisdictions have reached the same 
conclusion. In Renovest Co. v. Hodges Development Corp., 600 
A.2d 448 (N.H. 1991) the New Hampshire Supreme Court considered a 
buyer's obligation to perform under a contract for the purchase 
of an apartment complex which contained several conditions 
precedent. Two of the conditions required the buyer to notify 
the seller by a specified date if the buyer intended to terminate 
the contract because of an unsatisfactory inspection or an 
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inability to obtain financing. The buyer did not complete the 
sale and sued for recovery of its deposit. The seller defended 
on several grounds including the fact that the buyer had not 
given written notice within the deadlines set forth in the two 
conditions. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court recognized the general rule 
that ordinarily time is not made of the essence in a contract 
unless there is some indication that the parties intended 
otherwise. Id. at 452. However, the court concluded that this 
general rule was not applicable because the terms involved were 
express conditions precedent. Id. The court noted: 
The reasoning behind this rule is that when 
the parties expressly condition their 
performance upon the occurrence or non-
occurrence of an event, rather than simply 
including the event as one of the general 
terms of the contract, the parties' 
bargained-for expectation of strict 
compliance should be given effect. 
Id. at 452-53. 
Thus, the court strictly enforced the date stated in the 
contract. 
Similarly in Barnes v. Euster, 214 A.2d 807 (Md. Ct. App. 
1965) the Maryland Court of Appeals considered a case where a 
buyer sought specific performance of a contract which contained 
an express condition precedent requiring necessary zoning before 
a certain date. Although the court decided the case on other 
grounds, it recognized that even though the contract did not 
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expressly make time of the essence, by reason of the condition 
"the contract was like a unilateral contract, such as an option, 
in which the law makes time of the essence . . . ." Jd. at 809. 
See also, Clarke v. Lacv, 132 A.2d 478, 483 (Md. Ct. App. 1957). 
The trial court's conclusion that the time deadline of July 
6, 1993 was not material because a "time is of the essence" 
provision did not apply is wrong as a matter of law. An express 
condition precedent containing a time deadline expressly avoids 
the Contract if the stated event does not occur before the 
deadline. The condition does not require an additional explicit 
statement that time is of the essence. 
3. An Express Condition Precedent Must be 
Satisfied by Strict Compliance. 
Because the clause concerning the sale of adjacent property 
is an express condition precedent, which does not require a 
separate "time is of the essence" provision, it can only be 
satisfied by strict compliance. The trial court erred as a 
matter of law by concluding that the express condition precedent 
could be satisfied by material compliance so long as the adjacent 
property was sold within a reasonable time after July 6, 1993. 
Conclusion of Law No. 4. Record at 170. The trial court also 
erred as a matter of law by concluding that the express condition 
precedent could be satisfied by material compliance so long as 
the adjacent property was sold within the same number of days 
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after July 6, 1993 as the number of days the adjacent property 
was sold late. Conclusion of Law No. 5. Record at 170. 
Utah courts have consistently required strict compliance 
with express condition precedents. In Woodard v. Jensen, 740 
P.2d 272 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) cert, dismissed. 766 P.2d 1072 
(1988) the Court of Appeals, considered specific performance of a 
real estate purchase contract which made the seller's obligation 
conditioned upon the recording of a certain parcel with the 
county recorder. Subsequent changes in county requirements made 
it impossible to subdivide and record the parcel. The Court held 
that because recording was a condition precedent to the seller's 
duties and the condition precedent had not been fulfilled, the 
equitable remedy of specific performance was not available to the 
buyer. Id. at 274-275. 
Similarly in Welch Transfer and Storage. Inc. v. Oldham. 663 
P.2d 73 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme Court considered a contract 
to exchange real property which required the approval of the 
Small Business Administration ("SBAM) to the reciprocal 
assumption of loans. The SBA approved the mutual assumption but 
also required that each party guarantee the others' debt. This 
additional requirement by the SBA did not satisfy the condition. 
The Court held that: 
Where fulfillment of a contract is made to 
depend upon the act or consent of a third 
person over whom neither party has any 
control, the contract cannot be enforced 
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unless the act is performed or the consent 
given. 
Id. at 76. 
The Welch Transfer case recognizes the principle that a 
condition precedent must be strictly satisfied even if 
fulfillment of the condition depends upon the act of a third 
person. Fulfillment of the condition in the Schwartz/Fehlauer 
Contract that the adjacent property be sold before July 6, 1993 
depended upon the act of a third party, either Madsen or some 
other buyer. Welch Transfer teaches that the court cannot excuse 
the condition even though satisfaction of the condition is 
outside the control of either party. 
Another example is found in Braithwaite v. Sorensen. 561 
P.2d 1083 (Utah 1987) where the parties made performance of a 
real estate purchase contract dependent upon the release of a 
federal tax lien within three years. When the tax lien was not 
released, the buyers argued that the express condition should be 
excused since they were willing to pay the difference between the 
amount of the tax lien and the amount held on deposit in an 
escrow. The Supreme Court held that since the contingency did 
not occur within the three years the parties were released of all 
obligations under the contract. Ijd. at 1084. 
These cases are consistent with the major treatises on 
contracts and the Restatement. These authorities make the strict 
compliance requirement clear: 
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As a general rule, conditions which are 
either expressed or implied in fact must be 
exactly fulfilled or no liability can arise 
on the promise which such conditions qualify. 
5 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, § 675 at 
184 (3rd ed. 1961). 
If the occurrence of a condition is required 
by the agreement of the parties, rather than 
as a matter of law, a rule of strict 
compliance traditionally applies. 
2 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts. § 8.3 at 3 53 
(1990). 
If, however, the parties have made an event a 
condition of their agreement, there is no 
mitigating standard of materiality or 
substantiality applicable to the non-
occurrence of the event. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 (comment d). 
Several cases from other jurisdictions illustrate the 
application of these principles. In Ferlita v. Guarneri. 524 
N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) the court considered an action 
for specific performance of a real estate contract that was 
expressly conditioned upon the buyer obtaining a financing 
commitment within a specified time. The buyer did not obtain the 
commitment but scheduled a closing anyway. The seller did not 
attend the closing and the buyer sued for specific performance. 
The appellate court held that the buyer was not obligated to 
complete the sale. 
It is a fundamental tenet of contract law 
that a writing which clearly and 
unambiguously expresses the intention of the 
parties should not be modified by the court. 
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. . . The clause constitutes a defense to the 
[buyers] action for specific performance as a 
matter of law. 
Id. at 95-96. 
In Laz-Karp Realty. Inc. v. Gilbert, 777 F. Supp. 1085 
(D. R.I. 1990) the court considered a purchase and sale agreement 
for real estate which provided that either party could terminate 
the agreement if condemnation of the property did not occur by a 
specified date. When the condemnation did not occur, the buyer 
sued for return of its deposit. The court held that the parties' 
obligations to perform were excused because the condition 
precedent did not occur by the specified date. The court 
reasoned that condemnation might well have been to the benefit of 
the buyer, "[b]ut, even if no specific benefit flowed from 
condemnation, the parties had agreed upon it as the course of 
action." Id. at 1088. 
The Laz-Karp case points out the error of the trial court's 
conclusion that the July 6, 1993 date was not material or 
important so long as the sale of the adjacent property was 
completed first. No special benefit needed to have flowed to 
either Schwartz or Fehlauer by reference to the July 6, 1993 
date. The parties had agreed upon it as the date by which the 
sale of the adjacent property must be completed in order for 
Schwartz's obligations to survive. If the adjacent property did 
not sell by July 6, Schwartz had no obligation to sell to 
Fehlauer. 
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Finally, in Covington v. Robinson. 723 S.W.2d. 643 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1986) the parties had made a real estate purchase 
agreement contingent upon the buyers obtaining a bank loan for 
75% of the purchase price. The Tennessee Court of Appeals held 
that the trial court was in error in holding that a loan in the 
amount of 73.9% was substantial performance that would excuse the 
non-occurrence of the condition precedent. Id. at 645. 
The trial court erred because it permitted the express 
condition precedent to be satisfied by material or substantial 
compliance rather than strict compliance. Its legal conclusion 
that the express condition precedent was satisfied so long as the 
adjacent property sold within a reasonable time after July 6, 
1993 or within the extended term of the Madsen contract is 
contrary to law and should be reversed. 
4. The Express Condition Precedent in the 
Contract Does Not Create A Forfeiture. 
The Restatement of Contracts has recognized one limited 
situation in which conditions precedent may be excused in order 
to avoid a forfeiture. 
Excuse of a Condition to Avoid Forfeiture 
To the extent that the non-occurrence of a 
condition would cause disproportionate 
forfeiture, a court may excuse a non-
occurrence of that condition unless its 
occurrence was a material part of the agreed 
exchange. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 229. 
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Fehlauer did not argue this principle to the trial court and 
did not put on evidence that a forfeiture would occur. Also, the 
trial court did not rely upon this principle for his conclusions 
of law. Even if this principle had been considered, it does not 
apply. 
Courts have used this principle to excuse express conditions 
precedent in only a limited number of special circumstances not 
applicable here. For example, in the area of insurance 
contracts, courts will sometimes excuse the express condition 
requiring prompt notice because the insured will forfeit its 
right to indemnification after paying substantial premiums. See, 
e.g. Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 344 A.2d 555 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1975) aff'd, 371 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1977); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 
Murphy, 538 A.2d 219 (Conn. 1988). Courts will sometimes excuse 
an express condition requiring certain actions in order to renew 
a lease where the lessee has made substantial leasehold 
improvements. See, e.g. J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay 
Chelsea. Inc., 366 N.E.2d 1313 (N.Y. 1977); Ledford v. Atkins, 
413 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967). Courts will also occasionally 
excuse a condition to performance of a real estate purchase 
contract where substantial sums have already been paid to the 
seller. See, Wortman v. Jessen, 159 N.W.2d 564 (Neb. 1968). 
Courts will also sometimes excuse a condition precedent in the 
area of general contracts where one party has partially or 
completely performed his obligations. See, Burger King Corp. v. 
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Family Dining Inc., 426 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa.) aff'd.. 560 F.2d 
1168 (3rd Cir. 1977). 
The trial court did not face any of these situations because 
Fehlauer had made no payments to Schwartz on July 6, 1993 when 
the condition was to be satisfied.3 The closest finding that 
could conceivably be argued as a forfeiture by Fehlauer is that 
Fehlauer took on extra work in order to service his debt for the 
purchase of the property. Finding of Fact No. 23. Record at 
168. This event does not create a forfeiture, because Fehlauer 
will retain the benefits of his extra work regardless of whether 
he receives the property. 
Fehlauer will also forfeit nothing because his obligations 
under the Contract were entirely executory. To the extent that 
he relied upon his expectations under the Contract in preparing 
to perform, his reliance was not justified. The condition had 
not been satisfied by its own terms more than thirty days before 
Fehlauer was called upon to perform. Fehlauer knew that the 
condition precedent had not been satisfied when the adjacent 
property did not sell on or before July 6, 1993. He therefore 
had no justification in preparing to perform on August 13, 1993. 
3
 Fehlauer had made a $1,500.00 deposit with the real estate 
agent, which would be returned to him if the sale did not go 
through because of the failed condition. Exhibit 12. 
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C. The Trial Court did Not Find that Fehlauer and Schwartz 
had Made a Mistake of Fact so as to Support a 
Reformation of the Contract. 
1. Reformation of a Contract Requires a Finding 
by Clear and Convincing Proof that a Mutual 
Mistake of Fact Has Occurred. 
The final way in which the trial court attempted to excuse 
the express condition precedent was to remove the phrase "on or 
before July 6, 1993" and replace it with the phrase "to Nancy 
Madsen pursuant to agreements already in place". Conclusion of 
Law No. 6. Record at 170. 
A claim for reformation did not appear in the original 
complaint filed by Fehlauer. Record at 1-13. The trial court 
apparently considered the claim pursuant to an "Amendment to 
Complaint" filed May 2, 1994, less than eight days before the 
trial on May 10, 1994 and without an Order of the Court or 
written consent by Schwartz as required by Rule 15(a) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Record at 83-85. 
Even if the trial court properly had before it a claim for 
reformation, the trial court was still required to accurately 
apply the law of reformation. That law is well stated in Briggs 
v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770 (Utah 1985) where the Utah Supreme Court 
considered a claim for reformation of a life insurance policy. A 
wife had designated her sister as beneficiary under a life 
insurance policy provided by a bank when her husband opened a 
joint checking account. The husband contended that the wife 
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intended to make her sister a contingent rather than a primary 
beneficiary• The trial court ruled in favor of the husband but 
the Supreme Court reversed and held in favor of the sister. In 
making its holding the Court restated the law of reformation in 
Utah: 
As we have recently stated, a court's 
equitable powers are narrowly bounded. "A 
court does not have carte blanche to reform 
any transaction to include terms it believes 
are fair" . . . A contract may be reformed 
for either of two reasons. First, if the 
instrument does not embody the intentions of 
both parties to the contract, a mutual 
mistake has occurred, and reformation is 
appropriate. Second, if one party is 
laboring under a mistake about a contract 
term and that mistake either has been induced 
by the other party or is known by and 
conceded to bv the other party, then the 
inequitable nature of the other party's 
conduct will have the same operable effect as 
a mistake, and reformation is permissible. 
. . . Under either set of circumstances, 
because courts are reluctant to change 
contractual obligations and rights, the party 
seeking reformation must plead the 
circumstances constituting the mistake with 
particularity. Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) . . . 
Additionally, the party seeking reformation 
must establish the mistake by clear and 
convincing proof that "clinches what might be 
otherwise only probable to the mind." 
Id. at 772 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court found that the husband presented no 
evidence of mutual mistake by the sister on the one hand and the 
insurance company on the other. Nor did the husband present any 
evidence that the insurance company induced the mistake or knew 
of and took advantage of a mistake. Finally the trial court's 
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findings and conclusions did not address the issue of mutual 
mistake. The Supreme Court thus concluded that under settled law 
the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of reformation. 
Id. at 773. See also Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1994) 
(complaint did not plead mistake or fraud, much less describe 
them with particularity; evidence did not rise to standard of 
clear and convincing). 
2. The Trial Court did not Find that Fehlauer 
and Schwartz made a Mutual Mistake of Fact. 
Of all the findings of fact made by the trial court, none 
find that Schwartz and Fehlauer made a mutual mistake as to the 
wording of the express condition precedent making Schwartz' 
obligations contingent upon sale of adjacent property before July 
6, 1993. The closest finding concerning the condition is the 
following: 
6. With respect to paragraph 6, it was the 
understanding of plaintiff [Fehlauer], his 
realtor and the Coldwell agents that this 
language pertained to the prior known 
requirement that the sale of Parcels A and B 
to Ms. Madsen must occur or Parcel C would 
not be sold; if the Madsen sales fell 
through, defendant would not sell Parcel C. 
Record at 164. Appendix Tab 3. 
This finding does not contain the facts necessary to support the 
first reason stated in Briggs for reforming an instrument under 
Utah law. It does not find that the instrument fails to embody 
the intentions of both Schwartz and Fehlauer. At best, the 
finding states what Fehlauer and the realtors thought was 
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Schwartz's reason for including the condition language in the 
Contract. The unilateral understanding of one party never 
expressed to the other cannot form the basis of an equitable 
reformation. Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1985). 
Further, the trial court did not find that Fehlauer labored 
under a mistake about the express condition precedent and further 
did not find that Schwartz induced the mistake or that Schwartz 
knew of the mistake and concealed it. Thus, the trial court also 
did not find the facts necessary to support the second reason 
stated in Briggs for reformation of an instrument under Utah law. 
Without these findings of fact, the trial court's conclusion 
of law that the express condition precedent ought to be reformed 
constitutes an error of law. The trial court's conclusion 
improperly rewrote the Contract. 
3. The Evidence Does Not Contain Clear and 
Convincing Proof that Fehlauer and Schwartz 
made a Mutual Mistake of Fact. 
Even if the trial court had made findings of fact sufficient 
to support its conclusions of law, such findings would not have 
been supported by the evidence. Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provides in relevant part that: 
When findings of fact are made in actions 
tried by the court without a jury, the 
question of the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support the findings may thereafter be 
raised whether or not the party raising the 
question has made in the district court an 
objection to such findings or had made either 
a motion to amend them, a motion for 
judgment, or a motion for new trial. 
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This court may therefore examine the evidence even though 
Schwartz did not contest the evidence in the trial court because 
he was unable to attend. 
The trial transcript does not contain any evidence that the 
condition precedent requiring the sale of the adjacent property 
before July 6, 1994, did not embody the intentions of both 
parties or even that Fehlauer was laboring under a mistake about 
the Contract term. At trial, only two witnesses testified 
concerning the term. The first witness called by Fehlauer was 
the younger Williams, one of two agents who obtained the listing 
to sell the property for Schwartz. He testified as follows: 
Q And it follows the — No. 5 is not in your 
handwriting. 
A No, No. 5 is in Mr. Schwartz' handwriting. 
Q Would you read it once again to the court? 
A Yes. "Subject to sale of house and property located at 
841 South West Hoytsville Road, Coalville, on or before 
July 6, 1993." 
Q Did you have any discussion with Mr. Schwartz about why 
the July 6th date was entered into here? 
A I think — I don't remember an exact discussion on that 
date but it was to coincide with getting the closing 
done on the house and property which was scheduled for 
the first. And I'm not sure exactly why we picked the 
6th but I think it was just to buffer the time a little 
bit in case there was some lender delay. 
Q Do you remember — well, do the Madsen contracts, which 
are in evidence, did they require a closing date on or 
before July 1? 
A July 1, yes. 
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Q Do you know where the five days between July 1 and July 
6th come from? 
A I don't know exactly where that came from. But the 
purpose was to be certain that the Madsen money were 
safely in the bank before — 
Q Before — 
A Before closing on this, correct. 
Record at 278-279. 
The only other witness to testify concerning the terms of 
the Contract was the plaintiff Fehlauer. The sum of his 
testimony concerning the Contract terms was as follows: 
Q And that led to the offer that was dated June 25. 
A That's correct. 
Q And the counteroffer back and the final offer in which 
you accepted a full listing price of $120,000,00. 
Agreed to pay that price all on that same day. 
A Yes. 
Record at 319. 
The real estate agent for Fehlauer did not testify at the trial. 
The foregoing evidence does not support a finding, even 
viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's conclusion of law, that a mutual mistake had 
occurred between Schwartz and Fehlauer over the wording of the 
condition precedent. No one stated that the Contract condition 
should have been "to Nancy Madsen pursuant to agreements already 
in place" instead of "on or before July 6, 1993." The most that 
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could be said is that the younger Williams stated his belief as 
to the reason Schwartz chose the date of July 6, 1993. 
Further, Fehlauer never stated that the term was a mistake 
or that he was laboring under a mistake that the term should have 
read differently. Certainly, the evidence does not rise to the 
standard of establishing the mistake by clear and convincing 
proof that "clinches what might be otherwise only probable in the 
mind." Briaas v. Liddell. 699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985). 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's reformation of 
the Contract is neither supported by a finding of fact that a 
mutual mistake occurred nor by evidence establishing a mistake by 
clear and convincing proof. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and enter judgement in favor of Schwartz because, 
even taking the evidence presented solely by Fehlauer at trial, 
the express condition precedent to Schwartz's obligations was not 
satisfied or excused. Alternatively, the Court of Appeals should 
remand the case to the trial court for a new trial at a time that 
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Schwartz may attend, testify on his own behalf, and assist his 
counsel. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3C? day of /72«Vt~r^t^ , 
1994. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Bv /tUc^r #/0^^ 
R o b e r t G. Holt 
^Attorneys for Defendant 
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Janet A. Goldstein (4326) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Deer Valley Plaza, Suite 208 
Post Office Box 4556 
Park City, UT 84060 
(801) 649-1996 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
C. STEVEN FEHLAUER ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
THOMAS H. SCHWARTZ ; 
Defendant. ] 
) OBJECTION TO SCHEDULING 
) ORDER AND TRIAL SETTING, AND 
) MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
> Civil No. 930312024 CN 
> Judge: David S. Young 
Comes now Defendant, Thomas H. Schwartz and objects to the Scheduling Order and 
the trial setting in the above-noted case, and moves the Court to continue the trial date set in the 
matter. This Objection and Motion are supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
which is filed herewith. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of April, 1994 
Janet A. Goldstein 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the £T day of April, I certifiy that I caused to be served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Objection to Trial Setting and Motion to Continue Trial Date, postage prepaid, 
by mailing same to the following: 
H. James Clegg, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
^k^iiS^Lte— 
2 
Janet A. Goldstein (4326) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Deer Valley Plaza, Suite 208 
Post Office Box 4556 
Park City, UT 84060 
(801) 649-1996 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
C. STEVEN FEHLAUER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS H. SCHWARTZ 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO SCHEDULING 
ORDER AND TRIAL SETTING, AND 
MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
Civil No. 
Judge: 
930312024 CN 
David S. Young 
Comes now Defendant, Thomas H. Schwartz, by and through undersigned counsel, and 
respectfully submits the following Memorandum in Support of Objection to Scheduling Order 
and Trial Setting and Motion to Continue Trial. 
BACKGROUND 
The underlying dispute in this matter involves a claim for specific performance regarding 
a parcel of property in Summit County, Utah. Defendant is, however, a resident of the State 
of Massachusetts. 
In the early summer of 1993, the parties entered into an Earnest Money Agreement in 
which there were several conditions that had to be satisfied before a sale of the property could 
occur. Based on the non-occurrence of at least one condition, the sale did not close. Thereafter, 
Plaintiff initiated the instant action in September of 1993. At the same time, Plaintiff filed a 
Notice of Lis Pendens regarding the subject property. In early October, an Answer and 
Counterclaim was filed. In late October, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss the First and Third 
Causes of Action contained in the Counterclaim. Following discussions between counsel and 
agreement of the parties, Defendant agreed to drop the first and third causes of action in the 
Counterclaim and to appear at a deposition in Utah so that the case could either be settled or 
proceed on the real matter at issue in this case. 
On November 30, 1993, Defendant interrupted a visit with his daughter in Arizona and 
made a special trip to Salt Lake City to testify at a deposition scheduled by Plaintiff. At the 
conclusion of the deposition, the parties discussed the possibilities of settlement. Counsel for 
Plaintiff stated that he wanted to depose and/or obtain relevant documents from the real estate 
broker that had handled the transaction. On February 1, Plaintiffs counsel indicated that he had 
received the documents that he had requested from the broker. 
In January 1994, Defendant was drafted as a candidate by his political party in 
Massachusetts to run for a vacated seat in the Massachusetts Legislature. Thereafter, on 
February 1, Defendant made a settlement offer to resolve this matter. On February 4, 1994, 
Plaintiff filed a Request for Trial Setting. On February 10, 1994 Plaintiffs counsel indicated 
that he had sent a letter containing a counter-offer for settlement, which Defendant's counsel 
never received. 
In March, Plaintiffs counsel set up a conference call for March 17, 1994, for scheduling 
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in this matter, which conference call was never made. At that time, Defendant's counsel 
informed Plaintiffs counsel that Defendant would not be able to leave Massachusetts until July, 
due to Defendant's commitments in as a candidate for a seat in the Massachusetts State 
Legislature. Plaintiffs counsel, however, insisted on setting up a scheduling conference, which 
was held on the telephone with the Court on March 28, 1994. Thereafter, the Court set the trial 
in this matter for May 10 and 11, 1994. See copy of Scheduling Order attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A" and incorporated by reference herein. May 10, 1994 is the date of the primary 
election in the Massachusetts legislative race. See copy of certified letter from Betty Ann 
McCallum, Town Clerk, Town of Douglas, Massachusetts, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B" and incorporated by reference herein. 
Because of the necessity that Defendant remain in the state of Massachusetts until his 
campaign is completed, Defendant must object to the Scheduling Order and the trial setting in 
as set forth in Exhibit A, and moves the Court to continue the trial to a date in July or August 
of this year. 
ARGUMENT 
THE OBJECTION AND MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE IS TIMELY, NECESSARY, 
AND SUPPORTED BY GOOD CAUSE 
The Plaintiff in this case brought the instant suit against the Defendant last fall. Since 
that time, Defendant has cooperated fully in the process and has done nothing to cause 
unnecessary delay. This is not a case which has dragged on for years or one in which repeated 
continuances have been sought. The Plaintiff just recently completed his discovery. The 
Defendant has not even undertaken discovery in this matter. The Defendant has, however, a 
significant commitment in the form of his candidacy for the State Legislature of the State of 
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Massachusetts. The primary election in that race will be held on the first day that the Court just 
recently set for trial in this matter. See Exhibit B. The Defendant has no choice but to be 
present in Massachusetts on that date. Although at the time that the trial was set, Defendant's 
counsel objected to the setting on the basis of the Defendant's candidacy, counsel was at that 
time unaware of the primary election date. Based upon that new information, it is even more 
critical that the Defendant obtain a continuance of the trial date in this matter. 
Pursuant to Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may make a motion to 
continue a trial, upon a showing of good cause. The Defendant has made such a showing. See 
Exhibit MB." Additionally, there can be little doubt that in the event that the Defendant is not 
present at the trial of the case brought against him, the Defendant will be unable to assist in his 
defense, and the Defendant will be unable to present material evidence as to the events that 
occurred at the time and as to the matter of which the Plaintiff complains. The result would be 
overwhelming prejudice to the Defendant. 
The Defendant acknowledges that the grant of such a motion under Rule 40(b) lies within 
the discretion of the Court. However, in light of the fact that the trial setting was made, over 
the objection of the Defendant's counsel, less than ten days ago, that this is the first such 
request, that notice is being provided, that the Defendant's unavailability is virtually beyond his 
control, and that the Defendant is a resident of another state who clearly did not choose to 
become involved in this litigation in Utah, good cause exists to grant the continuance of the trial. 
In Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375, 1376 (Utah 1977), the court stated that, 
When counsel has made timely objections, given necessary notice, and has 
made a reasonable effort to have the trial date changed for good cause, courts 
have held it to be an abuse of discretion not to grant a continuance. 
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(footnote and citations omitted). In that case, the defendants' counsel was not available on the 
date that the court set for trial. The defendants promptly filed an objection, but the matter was 
not heard and the defendants did not appear at the trial without their counsel. A default was 
entered against the defendants. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case and held 
that, inter alia, on the basis of equity and "the basic rights of a party to be heard, the trial court 
erred in not setting aside the default judgment." Id. 
More recently, in State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982), Justice Durham noted 
that, 
It is well established in Utah, as elsewhere, that the granting of a 
continuance is at the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be 
reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Abuse mav be found where a 
party has made timely objections, given necessary notice and made a reasonable 
effort to have the trial date reset for good cause. 
Id. at 752 (emphasis added)(citations omitted). 
Although the grant of a continuance is within the discretion of the Court, under the 
circumstances of this case, it would be tantamount to an abuse of that discretion to deny the 
Defendant's Motion to Continue. Furthermore, in this case, the Plaintiff cannot complain of 
surprise or establish serious prejudice based on a continuance, whereas the denial of the 
continuance will force the Defendant into an untenable situation of having to forego his right to 
be heard at trial or forego his candidacy. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the Defendant has cooperated with the Plaintiff and his counsel's schedule 
in all respects. The only thing more that the Defendant could do would be to simply abdicate 
to the Plaintiff, which the Defendant is unwilling to do. The Plaintiff was fully aware of the 
5 
Defendant's unavailability when the Plaintiff insisted on setting an imminent trial date. To 
permit the matter to go forward and force the Defendant into making a choice of giving up his 
right to be heard at trial or giving up his candidacy, is manifestly unjust. There is no good 
reason to permit the Plaintiff to force the Defendant into such a choice, whereas there is clearly 
good cause to continue the trial date until after the Defendant's campaign is completed and his 
political obligations are satisfied. 
DATED this 5th day of April. 
Janet A. Goldstein 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the y day of April, I certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Objection to Scheduling Order and Trial Setting 
and Motion to Continue Trial Date, postage prepaid, by mailing same to the following: 
H. James Clegg, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FEHLAUER, C STEVEN 
PLAINTIFF, 
-VS-
SCHWARTZ, THOMAS H 
DEFENDANT. 
SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
TRIAL NOTICE 
CASE NO. 930312024 CN 
HONORABLE DAVID S YOUNG 
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON 3-28-94 
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED: 
1. THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON MAY 10, 1994 AT 9:00 A.M. 
2. ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 02 DAYS. 
3. THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL 
4. ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY 
5. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY 
6. EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY 
DONE _ 
7. A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON 
APRIL 26, 1994 AT 3:00 P .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR 
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE 
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE 
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. 
8. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT. 
9. THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS 
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE 
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING. 
10. IF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ANTICIPATES THAT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
WILL SHOW DAMAGES OF LESS THAN $20,000, COUNSEL SHOULD., <BRBBARE AN 
ORDER TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT. ^.S D I S ^ S 
11. OTHER MATTERS: IF RESOLVED IT IS TO BE SXF^]^T¥D''''T?£&.N 
RECORD @ PRE-TRIAL OR HAVE SIGNED STIPULATION/ORDE$\FILED PRIOS^ 
DATED THIS 28TH DAY OF/MA"RCHv 1994. ^ / gijMWN' \ 0 \ 
DISTRICT COURT s;£4;ov)MTV / - / 
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES INDICATED ON 'SHE.* 
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE. ' ,\;>xV 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE 
ATTACHED SCHEDULING ORDER AND TRIAL NOTICE, BY FIRST CLASS MAIL, 
POSTAGE PREPAID, TO THE FOLLOWING: 
PAESTDN.SmNLEY 
CLEGG, JAMES H. 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, 11TH FLOOR 
P. 0. BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145 
^GOLDSTEIN, JANET A. 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
DEER VALLEY PLAZA, STE 208 
P 0 BOX 4556 
PARK CITY UT 84060 
DATED THIS— 3(L DAY OF 2n^AL 19 fy 
DEPUTY CLERK 
March 29, 1994 
I hereby certify that Thomas H. Schwartz of 120 Orange Street, 
Douglas, is a candidate for State Representative in the Special 
State Primary on May 10th. After winning the primary, Mr. 
Schwartz will then be a candidate in the Special State Election 
on June 7th. If he wins this, he will have to attend sessions 
in the House of Representative until they recess on July 11th. 
A True Copy, ATTEST: 'tZe&~ 
McCallum 
Town Clerk 
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H. JAMES CLEGG (A0681) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
C. STEVEN FEHLAUER, 
Plaintiff, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. 
THOMAS H. SCHWARTZ, Civil No. 93*12024 
Defendant. 
This matter having come on regularly for trial at Coalville, Utah on May 10, 1994, 
plaintiff being present and represented by his counsel, H. James Clegg, and defendant 
being absent but represented specially by his counsel, Janet A. Goldstein, and Ms. 
Goldstein having renewed defendant's motion for continuance of trial and such being 
denied she objected to the trial's proceeding forward, invoked the exclusionary rule and 
declined to participate further until plaintiff rested, at which time she renewed her 
objection to die refusal to continue the trial setting, and die Court having heard evidence in 
the form of testimony and exhibits and having received die deposition testimony of 
No. 
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defendant, having heard argument of plaintiffs counsel and being fully advised, the Court 
now makes and enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. This dispute involves 17.24 acres of real property, five shares of water stock 
in West Hoytsville Irrigation Company and approximately 50 lengths of 40' sprinkler pipe 
used in connection therewith near Hoytsville, Summit County, Utah. Generally speaking, 
the property is located just soutii of 841 Soutii West Hoytsville Road; it is bounded on the 
west by that improved road connecting Hoytsville and Wanship; on the east it crosses the 
Weber River. It is more specifically described as: 
A TRACT OF LAND LYING IN SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 2 NORTH, RANGE 5 EAST, 
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN BEGINNING AT A POINT ON THE WEST LINE 
OF PARCEL 1 AS DESCRIBED IN THAT CERTAIN WARRANTY DEED IN FAVOR OF 
THOMAS H. SCHULTZ AND RECORDED IN BOOK 671 AT PAGE 21. SAID POINT 
OF BEGINNING BEING MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS BEGINNING AT A 
POINT NORTH ALONG SECTION LINE 1451.01 FEET AND EAST 3790.64 FEET FROM 
THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 20, SAID POINT ALSO BEING ON 
THE EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE OF A COUNTY ROAD; AND RUNNING 
THENCE NORTH 89°27' EAST 1023.27 FEET TO A POINT ON AN EXISTING FENCE 
LINE; THENCE ALONG SAID FENCE LINE THE FOLLOWING FOUR CALLS: 
1) SOUTH 16°36' WEST 59.46 FEET; THENCE 
2) SOUTH 23° 16'EAST 60.56 FEET; THENCE 
3) SOUTH 26°43' EAST 178.13 FEET; THENCE 
4) SOUTH 46°09' EAST 133.00 FEET; 
THENCE NORTH 74°13'10" EAST 172.96 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 00°28' EAST 146.00 
FEET; THENCE NORTH 84°27' EAST 72.60 FEET; MORE OR LESS, TO A POINT ON 
THE EAST LINE OF SAID SECTION 20; THENCE SOUTH ALONG SAID SECTION 
LINE 215.38 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 86°02'02" WEST 1240.53 FEET TO A POINT ON 
THE EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY OF THE AFOREMENTIONED COUNTY ROAD; 
THENCE ALONG SAID EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY THE FOLLOWING THREE 
CALLS: 
1) NORTH 09°54'56" WEST 59.06 FEET; THENCE 
2) NORTH 18°37'59" WEST 144.43 FEET; THENCE 
3) NORTH 18°32'15" WEST 450.89 FEET 
2 
TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
2. There are four real estate transactions which are pertinent to the matter and 
which are interrelated one to another: 
A. On July 1, 1992, defendant acquired approximately 24 acres, more or 
less, (Parcel ABC), from Robert H. Williams and Joan H. Williams, giving a note secured 
by trust deed for $200,000 and interest. A house and outbuildings are situated at the 
northwest corner of ABC. The west side of ABC fronts on an improved road and a river 
(Weber) runs through ABC on the east. A principal payment of $40,000, plus interest of 
$16,000, was due July 1, 1993. Upon payment of that amount, the principal balance owed 
Mr. and Mrs. Williams would be $160,000. The Williams/Schwartz (W/S) trust deed had 
a due-on-sale clause. 
Defendant decided to sell Parcel ABC and, on February 23, 1993, he listed it for 
six months with Coldwell-Banker Premier Realtors' Park City Office (Coldwell). It was 
multiple-listed and advertised both as a residential property and an agricultural property. It 
did not sell quickly as a single parcel but a buyer named Madsen was interested in the 
northern portion. She wished to purchase about 7 acres but, because of criteria of the 
conventional-mortgage industry which discriminates against encumbrances where a large 
proportion of value is in unimproved real estate, it was agreed that the portion desired by 
Ms. Madsen would be further divided into a north parcel and a south parcel. Parcel A, 
the northernmost, contains 3.89 acres, more or less, and includes the buildings. 
Conventional financing was applied for. Offers on Utah Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
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forms dated May 15, 1993 were submitted to defendant by Ms. Madsen for both Parcel A 
and Parcel B, discussed in the next paragraph. 
B. Parcel B, the other "Madsen" parcel, is irrigated hay or pasture land. 
It contains 2.84 acres, more or less. The price for Parcel B was $15,000, of which 
$13,000 was represented by a note secured by trust deed in favor of defendant. The 1-1/2 
shares of water stock to be transferred by defendant to Ms. Madsen was "tied" to Parcel B 
for defendant's security. Further, the two Schwartz/Madsen Earnest Money Sales 
Agreements were tied together so that both had to be performed or neither could be. The 
specified closing date for both contracts was July 1 so that the cash proceeds could be used 
toward the due-on-sale clause of the W/S trust deed. 
C. This left Parcel C, the property involved in this suit. Defendant had 
listed it at $120,000. The advertising was seen by plaintiff and his wife who desired to 
build in a rural area to raise their young family. However, because of plaintiffs 
professional commitments, it was necessary that they locate within driving distance of 
University of Utah and Veterans' Administration hospitals in Salt Lake City. They 
believed Parcel C to be ideal for their needs. 
3. At all times, defendant had made it clear to Coldwell that he would not sell 
Parcel C unless Parcels A and B were first sold. 
4. Plaintiff made an offer of $115,000 on June 25, 1993, using the then-current 
Utah Earnest Money Sales Agreement form. By use of fax machines, the common way of 
handling the various negotiations in the Madsen and Fehlauer transactions, defendant 
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received it that day and insisted on the full listing price. On the addendum/counteroffer 
form, defendant added paragraph 6: "Subject to sale of house & property located at 841 
S. W. Hoytsville Rd, Coalville on or before July 6, 1993", the point which he later urged 
to repudiate the transaction. This documentation is the Schwartz/Fehlauer (S/F) contract; 
plaintiff requests a decree of specific performance. 
5. Plaintiff accepted the same day. 
6. With respect to paragraph 6, it was the understanding of plaintiff, his realtor 
and the Coldwell agents that this language pertained to the prior known requirement that 
the sale of Parcels A and B to Ms. Madsen must occur or Parcel C would not be sold; if 
the Madsen sales fell through, defendant would not sell Parcel C. 
7. The materiality of the July 6 date is at issue. July 1 may have been a 
material date: on that day, defendant was obliged to make his annual payment of $56,000 
to Robert Williams; for that reason, July 1 was the scheduled closing date for the Madsen 
sales. Because those sales did not close on or before July 1, defendant was required1 to 
borrow $56,000 at a claimed cost to him of $16,000. [Part of the money came through an 
I.R.A. transaction which might result in an early-withdrawal penalty; at the time of his 
deposition, defendant did not know whether a penalty would be imposed or not.] 
*By July 1, all of the property was contracted for sale and it is certainly possible, 
perhaps likely in view of their other courtesies and accommodations to defendant, that Mr. 
and Mrs. Williams would have extended the time for the annual payment until the other 
transactions closed; the W/S note could then be paid off. Defendant did not make this 
request, or even inquire, of the Williamses. 
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8. As to July 6, defendant testified at deposition that he chose this date on June 
25 because he feared the Madsen sales could not be closed on or before July 1 and this 
extra five days might be needed. 
9. Defendant believed that the Madsen transactions would fail as a matter of 
law if not closed by July 1, which he extended to July 6, and he could then put all three 
parcels back on the market. 
10. The closing of Parcel A did not occur on or before July 6 because of 
problems with Ms. Madsen's mortgage banker. While she had qualified as a borrower, 
the comparables provided did not, in the banker's judgment, justify the sales price of 
Parcel A. New comparables had to be found, which required several days. Ms. Madsen 
was able to sign all documents (through her attorney-in-fact) on Friday, July 16, 1993. 
11. A standard printed provision, Paragraph Q, in the Utah Earnest Money Sales 
Agreements executed by Ms. Madsen provided: 
Time is of essence-Unavoidable delay. In the event that this sale cannot be 
closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes, 
fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by 
lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or 
Seller, then the closing date shall be extended seven (7) [working] days 
beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) 
days beyond the closing date [July 1] provided herein. Thereafter, time is of 
the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates. 
"Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed 
and delivered by all parties to the transaction. 
12. Defendant was unaware of, or did not think about, this provision set forth in 
Paragraph Q until July 6 or shortly thereafter. 
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13. At deposition, it was defendant's belief that he had the power to revoke the 
Madsen transactions when they didn't close on July 1. While Paragraph Q may ordinarily 
extend a land sales contract under circumstances of lender delay, there was no lender-delay 
so far as Parcel B was concerned. Because defendant was the only lender on that 
property, he reasoned that Paragraph Q didn't come into play. Since Parcel A could not 
be purchased without concurrent purchase of Parcel B and Parcel B was in unexcused 
default after July 1, defendant was arguably not obliged to proceed. However, he did 
proceed. 
14. The net cash available to defendant from the Madsen sales would have been 
insufficient to pay off Mr. and Mrs. Williams and, upon closing the Madsen transactions, 
defendant would have to come up with some new money. 
15. At some point before July 1, Mr. and Mrs. Williams agreed with defendant 
that they would not enforce the due-on-sale clause of the W/S trust deed but, instead, 
would accept $80,000 in cash and take a new note and trust deed against Parcel C for the 
remaining $80,000, giving defendant two additional years of financing, giving him some 
cash from the Madsen sales and avoiding his injecting new money. 
16. As it turned out, following usual procedures for signing closing documents, 
recording deeds and encumbrances and disbursing proceeds, defendant did not receive his 
money from the Madsen sale until Tuesday, July 20. 
17. In the meantime, contrary to the wishes of defendant, Ms. Madsen took 
possession of Parcels A and B. Defendant was furious because he had not received the 
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sales proceeds. He demanded that Ms. Madsen pay $500 per day for possession until he 
received his money. When she agreed, he insisted that it be $1,000 per day, to which she 
also acceded. He then demanded $2,000 per day. Defendant then called the Summit 
County Sheriff to have Ms. Madsen removed; the Sheriff refused to do so but, on the 
advice of the Summit County Attorney, he requested Ms. Madsen to secure the premises 
with her belongings inside and remove her family pending disbursement of the funds, 
which she did. 
18. Defendant blamed Coldwell for permitting this early possession; Coldwell 
denied it had. Defendant filed a complaint with the Board of Realtors concerning the 
handling of the transaction. 
19. Inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Williams had not received their $80,000 as 
agreed on July 1, Old Republic Title Insurance company of Utah, Inc. (Old Republic), the 
title company charged with closing the transaction and disbursing the funds, sought to pay 
them $333.07 as interest for the delayed payment. Defendant, while in the title company's 
lobby, became loud, irate and belligerent, threatening to sue Coldwell and Old Republic. 
To stop this unfortunate scene, Old Republic refunded the $333.07 to defendant, reducing 
its own charges by that amount. 
20. By its terms, the S/F contract was to close on August 13, 1993. On August 9, 
Old Republic sent, by Federal Express, the seller's closing documents to defendant in 
Massachusetts for signature, notarization and return. 
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21. On August 11, two days before the closing date, plaintiff paid $120,000 cash 
to Old Republic. Plaintiff and his wife appeared at the title company on that day and 
signed all documents required of them. 
22. Thoroughly angered, and with his own re-financing of Parcel B secure, 
defendant refused to honor the S/F contract and never signed or returned the closing 
documents. Instead, he sent them, unsigned, to his attorney after this litigation 
commenced. 
23. Plaintiff did everything required of him to purchase Parcel C on or before 
the time required for his performance; further, plaintiff relied on the acquisition of the 
property and, to service his own debt in connection therewith, he contracted with the 
Veterans' Administration to provide medical care at the V.A. Hospital in Helena, 
Montana. To do so, he must provide weekend services at the hospital in Helena from 
Friday night to Monday morning, save four hours. This has required as many as three 
weekends per month but has now stabilized at every-third-weekend. This extra work is a 
hardship on him and his family and illustrates the plaintiffs desire to acquire and enjoy 
Parcel C. 
24. The only "time is of the essence" provision in the S/F contract relates to 
events following the closing date, not one preceding it such as Ms. Madsen's failure to 
close on or before July 6. 
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25. There is no evidence that closing of the Madsen agreements by July 6 was 
particularly material or important as a ,fdrop-dead date" for the S/F contract; it was only 
material that the Madsen transactions first close, which they did. 
26. The $120,000 paid by plaintiff remains on deposit, at interest, with Old 
Republic. 
27. The S/F contract provides for recovery of costs and reasonable attorneys' 
fees from the party in breach. 
28. It was reasonable and necessary for plaintiff to engage the assistance of 
counsel in petitioning for and obtaining relief from this Court; attorneys' fees of 
$10,263.75 has been earned and is appropriate and reasonable. 
29. The S/F contract terms include payment of scheduled closing costs and real 
estate commissions and provided that marketable tide will be conveyed to the buyer; in this 
instance, marketable title requires the W/S trust deed to be cleared. 
30. Plaintiff has been out of possession of the property since August 13, 1993 
and has received no damages, interest or rental; he has had to pay interest on his own debt 
in order to maintain his tender of performance. 
Having made these Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. It is appropriate to receive and consider extrinsic or parol evidence when 
analyzing the materiality of a contract term. 
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2. This is especially true in an equity case for specific performance of a land 
sales contract. 
3. Time of performance may be analyzed for materiality; this is particularly 
true when there is no applicable "time is of the essence" provision. 
4. Under the facts and circumstances of this transaction, the closing of the 
Madsen contracts by July 6 was not a material term of the S/F contract so long as those 
contracts were actually closed within a reasonable time after July 6, which they were. 
5. Alternatively, and as an independent ground for relief, the extension of the 
Madsen closing date for 15 days, from July 1 to July 16 extended the July 6 provision of 
the addendum/counterclaim of the S/F contract for the same number of days, to July 21, 
1993. Ms. Madsen had closed before that date so the S/F contract remained viable. 
6. Alternatively, and as another independent ground for relief, by its equity 
jurisdiction the Court can reform paragraph 6 of the counteroffer/addendum to read as was 
understood and intended: "Subject to sale of house & property located at 841 S. W. 
Hoytsville Rd, Coalville to Nancy Madsen pursuant to agreements already in place." 
7. Plaintiff performed all things required of him on or before the date required. 
8. Defendant breached his contract to convey Parcel C without justification. 
9. The Court has jurisdiction and authority in equity to compel specific 
performance of the S/F contract according to its terms and should do so in light of the law 
and the evidence. 
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10. Plaintiffs counsel is entitled, as provided in the S/F contract, to recover a 
reasonable fee and costs for assisting plaintiff in obtaining relief from defendant's breach. 
11. The sum on deposit at Old Republic is available to the Court to specifically 
enforce performance of the S/F contract and for payment of attorneys' fees and costs. 
12. The interest incurred on the sum deposited with Old Republic should be paid 
to plaintiff in partial reimbursement of loss of use of the property and the interest cost of 
maintaining his tender of performance. 
DATED this /&^flay o f ^ ^ 1 9 9 4 . 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
C. STEVEN FEHLAUER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THOMAS H. SCHWARTZ, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND 
RELATED ORDERS 
Civil No. 93*12024 
Having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court 
makes and enters its judgment, decree of specific performance and related orders: 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to, and is hereby awarded, specific performance of die 
Schwartz/Fehlauer (S/F) Earnest Money Sales Agreement of June 25, 1993 upon the 
ground and for the reason mat all material terms and conditions of the agreement were 
timely met. 
2. As an alternative and independent ground, the S/F agreement should be, and 
hereby is, reformed so mat paragraph 6 of the Counteroffer reads as follows: "Subject to 
sale of house & property located at 841 S. W. Hoytsville Rd, Coalville to Nancy Madsen 
pursuant to agreements already in place." With that reformation, all terms and conditions 
of the agreement were met. 
3. As another alternative and independent ground, the July 6, 1993 reference in 
the addendum/counteroffer was extended fifteen days to and until July 21 in conformity 
with the extension of closing of the Madsen/Schwartz agreements, and all terms and 
conditions of the S/F agreement were met. 
4. From the funds it holds on deposit, plaintiff shall record with the Summit 
County Recorder a certified copy of this Decree upon its entry and filing with the Clerk of 
the Court. 
5. Unless stayed by this Court or an appellate court of appropriate jurisdiction, 
with such supersedeas bond as is appropriate, it is ordered and decreed upon such 
recording with the Summit County Recorder, marketable title to the following described 
real property shall immediately and without further acts or instruments, vest in C. Steven 
Fehlauer and Roxanne D. Fehlauer, his wife, as joint tenants and not as tenants in 
common, and they shall be entitled to immediate possession of said real property: 
A TRACT OF LAND LYING IN SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 2 NORTH, RANGE 5 EAST, 
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN BEGINNING AT A POINT ON THE WEST LINE 
OF PARCEL 1 AS DESCRIBED IN THAT CERTAIN WARRANTY DEED IN FAVOR OF 
THOMAS H. SCHULTZ AND RECORDED IN BOOK 671 AT PAGE 21. SAID POINT 
OF BEGINNING BEING MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS BEGINNING AT A 
POINT NORTH ALONG SECTION LINE 1451.01 FEET AND EAST 3790.64 FEET FROM 
THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 20, SAID POINT ALSO BEING ON 
THE EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE OF A COUNTY ROAD; AND RUNNING 
THENCE NORTH 89°27' EAST 1023.27 FEET TO A POINT ON AN EXISTING FENCE 
LINE; THENCE ALONG SAID FENCE LINE THE FOLLOWING FOUR CALLS: 
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1) SOUTH 16°36' WEST 59.46 FEET; THENCE 
2) SOUTH 23° 16' EAST 60.56 FEET; THENCE 
3) SOUTH 26°43' EAST 178.13 FEET; THENCE 
4) SOUTH 46°09* EAST 133.00 FEET; 
THENCE NORTH 74° 13'10" EAST 172.96 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 00°28' EAST 146.00 
FEET; THENCE NORTH 84°27' EAST 72.60 FEET; MORE OR LESS, TO A POINT ON 
THE EAST LINE OF SAID SECTION 20; THENCE SOUTH ALONG SAID SECTION 
LINE 215.38 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 86°02'02" WEST 1240.53 FEET TO A POINT ON 
THE EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY OF THE AFOREMENTIONED COUNTY ROAD; 
THENCE ALONG SAID EASTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY THE FOLLOWING THREE 
CALLS: 
1) NORTH 09°54'56" WEST 59.06 FEET; THENCE 
2) NORTH 18°37'59"" WEST 144.43 FEET; THENCE 
3) NORTH 18°32'15" WEST 450.89 FEET 
TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
6. Old Republic Title Insurance Company of Utah, Inc, (Old Republic) is 
hereby ordered to pay off all liens and encumbrances of record against Parcel C, including 
all sums, together with interest to date of disbursement, owed Mr. and Mrs. Robert 
Williams. Real property taxes shall be paid, prorated if necessary to the date hereof. If 
there are any reasons marketable title is not available to plaintiff at that point, Old 
Republic shall notify plaintiffs counsel and he shall notify the Court. 
7. Upon notice from plaintiffs counsel to so do, Old Republic is also ordered 
to pay delinquent assessments, if any, owed West Hoytsville Irrigation Company for the 
five shares of irrigation water involved in the S/F transaction; counsel shall file with the 
Clerk of the Court a written certificate showing the delinquent amount and its calculation. 
8. Plaintiff shall ascertain whether the requisite 50 lengths of irrigation 
sprinkler pipe are physically present on Parcel C, or otherwise available to him, in as good 
condition as on August 11, 1993, reasonable wear and tear excepted. If it is, he shall file 
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his certificate so stating with the Clerk of this Court for inclusion in this record. If it is 
not, plaintiff shall advise his counsel of the particulars and he shall notify the Court. 
9. West Hoytsville Irrigation Company is hereby ordered to transfer and deliver 
five shares of water stock from defendant's account to plaintiff upon service of a certified 
copy of this Judgment and Decree to the managing agent of said water company; it shall 
not refuse to do so based upon delinquent assessments inasmuch as provision therefor is 
made, supra. 
10. From the sums remaining on deposit after payment of the aforesaid sums, 
Old Republic is ordered to pay the scheduled closing costs, including tide insurance costs 
and realtors' commissions as set forth on the proffered settlement documents. In addition, 
it shall pay to itself such extra costs in reasonable amount as are made necessary by 
defendant's failure to close on August 11, 1993, which shall include die administrative cost 
of accountings, disbursements and certificates made necessary by these orders. 
11. Old Republic is further ordered to pay from the sums on deposit an 
attorneys' fee of $10,263.75 to Snow, Christensen and Martineau, which shall include out-
of-pocket expenses of $265.86 and taxable court costs of $505.20. 
12. Old Republic is further ordered to pay to plaintiff all interest accrued on the 
escrowed sum as he has been out-of-possession of the real property during the time the 
interest was earned. 
13. When all of the foregoing is accomplished, Old Republic is ordered to pay 
any sum remaining on deposit over to defendant. 
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14. Old Republic shall then file with the Clerk of this Court, referencing this 
matter by name and civil number, its accounting for sums distributed and its certificate that 
it has carried out these orders insofar as they are directed to Old Republic. 
DATED this fe^day o f J f t y T W . 
BY THE COURT: 
uavia d. iqnng, l^^S^t idge 
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